Views that you want to be true
This might be fun:

What are some philosophical views that you really want to be true, but are pretty sure they aren't? Maybe the view would solve a lot of problems, or would really streamline your overall picture, or is just really, really cool; but, unfortunately, it seems to have one (or two) fatal flaws of its own.

This post has 2 points: (i) it will be fun to see what views people pick, and (ii) maybe someone will put up a view with a supposedly fatal problem, but someone else will know of a solution to the problem.

I'd like it if Chisholm's agent causation view were correct. It would help out a lot in the free will and moral responsibility debates (and be so empowering!). But, I feel like it's not true, unfortunately.
Posted by Justin Snedegar on 12.13.2008 at 9:02am
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Josh (UCSB) (mail):
Cool topic. I agree that the agent causation view, at least on certain understandings, likely falls into this category of being desirable but false. Here are some others that immediately come to mind (I'll post more if I think of them):

(1) I think I go back and forth on theism. Sometimes I want there to be a god. I'm pretty sure I wouldn't want the Judeo-Christian-Islamic god to exist. He's pretty mean. But it would probably be nice if there was a god of the philosophers---i.e. a being that is all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful. I suppose it would confer more "meaning" (as people say) on our existence. But I'm not really sure the existence of such a being would really do this. If this being just exists and never interacts with us or tells us we need to do such-and-such because it's part of some noble cosmic goal, then I'm not sure it would make much difference. If it all came with a super-cool after-life, then that certainly would be nice. It would be nice to see loved ones in an after-life, etc. But, then again, would I really want to live forever, even if it was filled with happiness? I'm not sure. So, I'm pretty sure there's no such being, but it would probably be nice if there was one.

(2) I guess I'd also like the view in meta-ethics to be true that says it's in our self-interest to be moral. Ethical egoists, like Rand, seem to think this. But I don't think this view just is ethical egoism. Some, for example, have held this view about ethics, but weren't ethical egoists. They just thought God, for example, would punish us severely in the end if we are immoral, so it's in our self-interest (long-term, at least) to be moral. And some, although this is quite controversial I think, seem to interpret eudaimonic views of ethics as ones that say there is some strong connection between being moral and doing what's in one's self-interest. So these non-ethical-egoist views just hold that there is some connection between morality and self-interest that isn't internal or built into the ethical view itself. I'd like this view to be true just because it would probably make being moral easier, psychologically speaking. (Here I'm assuming that we tend to be more easily motivated by what's in our self-interest than what's in the interest of others.) But I think it's pretty clearly false. Morality often requires us to do what's good for others, not ourselves. They're requirements of morality, not prudence.
12.18.2008 12:51pm

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