Epistemic vs. metaphysical possibility
I notice that not much has happened at H/P in the last week. I've been on a family vacation and Lewis went to a conference at Cornell (I think). Maybe he should do a post about the conference? Also, we've recently added Matt Glass (UC-Irvine LPS) to the list of authors. He should post as well...Matt.
While I was at the beach, I was getting a jump on some reading for my first-year seminar this fall. Right now, I'm finishing up Naming and Necessity. This makes about the third time I've read it, and I'm glad I'm re-reading it. I guess I should have picked up on this earlier, but I finally am realizing how important the distinction between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility is. I read Lewis's On the Plurality of Worlds before I read Naming and Necessity all the way through, so I was originally pretty loose in what I would allow into my space of metaphysical possibility. Kripke seemed a little too restrictive...I could not have been a duck (even if the possible world were populated with very intelligent ducks who functioned much like humans), cats could not have been demons. But, drawing the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility, these restrictions seem not only tolerable, but intuitive. It is epistemically possible that cats are demons (we may find this out), but if cats are animals, then it is metaphysically necessary that cats are animals.
I have one worry. It's not a terribly big worry, but one nonetheless. I think I buy into Kripke's more restricted version of metaphysical possibility mainly because I buy into (for the most part) Kripke's views on language. And I get nervous when people draw metaphysical conclusions from considerations of language. I'm not sure why, but I do. Probably something to do with Putnam's whole "Brains in a Vat" argument.
So, I would like to read more about the EP/MP distinction. I know that Soames has a paper, that I'll get to at some point, called "Actually" where he discusses these issues (I think). What else might be good? Also, where can I find some good stuff on drawing metaphysical conclusions from considerations in language?
While I was at the beach, I was getting a jump on some reading for my first-year seminar this fall. Right now, I'm finishing up Naming and Necessity. This makes about the third time I've read it, and I'm glad I'm re-reading it. I guess I should have picked up on this earlier, but I finally am realizing how important the distinction between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility is. I read Lewis's On the Plurality of Worlds before I read Naming and Necessity all the way through, so I was originally pretty loose in what I would allow into my space of metaphysical possibility. Kripke seemed a little too restrictive...I could not have been a duck (even if the possible world were populated with very intelligent ducks who functioned much like humans), cats could not have been demons. But, drawing the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility, these restrictions seem not only tolerable, but intuitive. It is epistemically possible that cats are demons (we may find this out), but if cats are animals, then it is metaphysically necessary that cats are animals.
I have one worry. It's not a terribly big worry, but one nonetheless. I think I buy into Kripke's more restricted version of metaphysical possibility mainly because I buy into (for the most part) Kripke's views on language. And I get nervous when people draw metaphysical conclusions from considerations of language. I'm not sure why, but I do. Probably something to do with Putnam's whole "Brains in a Vat" argument.
So, I would like to read more about the EP/MP distinction. I know that Soames has a paper, that I'll get to at some point, called "Actually" where he discusses these issues (I think). What else might be good? Also, where can I find some good stuff on drawing metaphysical conclusions from considerations in language?
Posted by Justin Snedegar on
07.05.2008 at 6:56am
I think you may be framing this issue backwards. Kripke's arguments in Naming and Necessity are compelling (arguably) because you already believed that it would be possible for Aristotle not to have been the instructor of Alexander. You already thought that it isn't possible for cats to be demons (given that they are in fact mammals).
The arguments proceed from metaphysical intuitions toward conclusions about the semantics of proper names and kind terms. You can't really get any metaphysically loaded conclusions out of the semantic theory itself. Take the claim that there is no possible world in which Justin is a duck. That claim isn't entailed by names being directly referential or their being rigid designators, unless one combines those theses with, say, species essentialism, and the fact that you are not a duck.
I'm not sure I see why you are thinking of this as a case of reasoning to metaphysical conclusions from commitments about language.