Mon Mar 27
Lewis Powell
I attended the session on Knowledge and its Practical limits and have been thinking a lot about the bank cases mentioned at the session. The cases look something like this:
Low Stakes:
Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. It isn't important that they deposit their checks right away, as they have no impending bills. But, as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long. In no mood for a long wait, Hannah says to sarah, 'I know the bank will be open tomorrow, since I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we can deposit our paychecks tomorrow morning.'
Our intuition is that Hannah does know (under the assumption that the bank is open on Saturday).
Then we are asked to consider a case like the following:
High Stakes:
Same as Low Stakes, except that now Hannah and Sarah know they have impending bills that won't be covered unless they make their deposits by Saturday. Hannah notes that the bank was open two weeks before on a Saturday morning, but Sarah points out that banks do change their hours. Hannah says, 'I guess you're right. I don't know that the bank will be open tomorrow.'
Allegedly, the intuition in high stakes is that Sarah's claim not to know is true.
While I don't share that intuition, I have a two part case that I want to put out there.
Stubborn High Stakes:
Same as Low Stakes, except that now Hannah and Sarah know they have impending bills that won't be covered unless they make their deposits by Saturday. Hannah notes that the bank was open two weeks before on a Saturday morning, but Sarah points out that banks do change their hours. Hannah says, 'Banks don't change their hours that often. It'll be open tomorrow.' Sarah replies, 'You don't know that."
Presumably, in this case, one's intuitions will be the same as the intuitions in the normal high stakes case. Hannah's stubbornness doesn't seem like the sort of thing that would impact this question. But now, consider this:
Stubborn High Stakes Epilogue:
Sarah was driving the car, and so, despite Hannah's protest, stopped at the bank. After waiting through the long line, as they are depositing their checks, Sarah asks, 'Is this bank open on Saturdays?' The bank teller responds, 'Yes, from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m.' Hannah turns to Sarah and says, 'I knew it.'
My response is that, while Hannah might be more commendable had she not issued an "I-told-you-so", her utterance is correct. If you don't share the intuition, one thing to make sure of is that you are correctly imagining the case, keeping in mind that Hannah is epistemically in the same position in this case as in low stakes, where we had the inuition that she did know.
What can the IRI defender say about the case/those intuitions?
A Stanley-type account's best response, considering the intuition as data (i.e. rather than rejecting the intuition) is to argue that Hannah is conflating her epistemic position after the check's have been deposited, when the stakes are low again, with the position she was in throughout the case. And this would work well, I think, with Stanley's response to the intuitions for High Attributor-Low Subject Stakes (cases where the attributor is in high stakes, but is assessing the position of someone in low stakes). One might think that the response works just as well for this case as it does in H.A.L.S., but at the very least, this is another cluster of scenarios in which our intuitions have to be explained as the product of confusion and thinking someone was saying something they were not.*
Perhaps I can press this worry further with the following cases (for all of which, it is true that the butler is the killer):
Whodunnit? pt. 1:
James and Stephanie are watching a mystery movie at home. In the first half an hour of the film, Stephanie gets sufficient evidence to conclude that the butler was the killer (fill in whatever details you find necessary to get the intuition that she knows). She says to James, 'I know who did it. It was the butler.'
IRI-account predicts: Her ascription was true.
Good so far. I don't know precisely how to quantify stakes, but since they are described as higher or lower, I label the stakes in this part X and describe further stakes as X+ for higher, or X- for lower, and X? for when I am unsure as to how the stakes compare.
Whodunnit? pt. 2:
(Immediately after pt 1)
In response to Stephanie, James says, "You want to bet? A hundred dollars says it wasn't the butler.'
Stakes: X?.
I'm not quite sure what I think happens to the stakes at the mere possibility of a bet.
Whodunnit? pt. 3a:
Stephanie accepts the bet. James thinks to himself, 'It's still very early in the film, she doesn't know who the killer is.'
Stakes: X+. There is now money riding on the bet, and so, provided we are imagining the right sort of case, the IRI account (and the intuitions Stanley uses to motivate his view) would be that James's thought is right, she does not know.
Whodunnit? pt. 3b:
(Instead of pt. 3a) Stephanie declines the bet, because a hundred dollars is a lot to risk over a movie. James says, "See, you don't know. It was just a guess."
Stakes: X The bet has been refused, so the stakes are back to normal. Thus, IRI predicts that, by rejecting the bet, Stephanie maintains her knowledge (or regains it, if the mere offer of a bet was sufficient to raise stakes).
Epilogue to 3a or b: As it is revealed that the butler did it, Stephanie says, "I knew it."
Our intuitions about these cases should diverge for an IRI account, since in (3a) she is evaluating her self in a high stakes scenario, and in (3b) she is evaluating herself in the same stakes as the original scenario. I don't think the cases do diverge though. I think that in either case, her knowledge claim is correct.
If I wanted to make this more directly comparable to the Hannah Bank cases, James would reply with something like, "Movies do sometimes have twist endings." Which might alter my intuitions, but I also think it alters Hannah's evidence base, and thus, might be triggering the wrong sort of intuitions.
Even if people don't share my intuition about the truth of the knowledge claim, there is some data here, namely, that people are often inclined to make such an utterance as a retrospective ascription, so, even if you think its false, some story should be given as to why it is not at all rare in such cases to make the claim.
*Contextualists might fare slightly better, in that they can agree that the utterance of "I knew it" is true in that the utterance in the epilogue context expresses a relation that did obtain throughout the case. However, as I think that independent of this worry, contextualism about "knows" is not very plausible, there are many better worries about contextualism to spend time on.
I attended the session on Knowledge and its Practical limits and have been thinking a lot about the bank cases mentioned at the session. The cases look something like this:
Low Stakes:
Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. It isn't important that they deposit their checks right away, as they have no impending bills. But, as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long. In no mood for a long wait, Hannah says to sarah, 'I know the bank will be open tomorrow, since I was just there two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we can deposit our paychecks tomorrow morning.'
Our intuition is that Hannah does know (under the assumption that the bank is open on Saturday).
Then we are asked to consider a case like the following:
High Stakes:
Same as Low Stakes, except that now Hannah and Sarah know they have impending bills that won't be covered unless they make their deposits by Saturday. Hannah notes that the bank was open two weeks before on a Saturday morning, but Sarah points out that banks do change their hours. Hannah says, 'I guess you're right. I don't know that the bank will be open tomorrow.'
Allegedly, the intuition in high stakes is that Sarah's claim not to know is true.
While I don't share that intuition, I have a two part case that I want to put out there.
Stubborn High Stakes:
Same as Low Stakes, except that now Hannah and Sarah know they have impending bills that won't be covered unless they make their deposits by Saturday. Hannah notes that the bank was open two weeks before on a Saturday morning, but Sarah points out that banks do change their hours. Hannah says, 'Banks don't change their hours that often. It'll be open tomorrow.' Sarah replies, 'You don't know that."
Presumably, in this case, one's intuitions will be the same as the intuitions in the normal high stakes case. Hannah's stubbornness doesn't seem like the sort of thing that would impact this question. But now, consider this:
Stubborn High Stakes Epilogue:
Sarah was driving the car, and so, despite Hannah's protest, stopped at the bank. After waiting through the long line, as they are depositing their checks, Sarah asks, 'Is this bank open on Saturdays?' The bank teller responds, 'Yes, from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m.' Hannah turns to Sarah and says, 'I knew it.'
My response is that, while Hannah might be more commendable had she not issued an "I-told-you-so", her utterance is correct. If you don't share the intuition, one thing to make sure of is that you are correctly imagining the case, keeping in mind that Hannah is epistemically in the same position in this case as in low stakes, where we had the inuition that she did know.
What can the IRI defender say about the case/those intuitions?
A Stanley-type account's best response, considering the intuition as data (i.e. rather than rejecting the intuition) is to argue that Hannah is conflating her epistemic position after the check's have been deposited, when the stakes are low again, with the position she was in throughout the case. And this would work well, I think, with Stanley's response to the intuitions for High Attributor-Low Subject Stakes (cases where the attributor is in high stakes, but is assessing the position of someone in low stakes). One might think that the response works just as well for this case as it does in H.A.L.S., but at the very least, this is another cluster of scenarios in which our intuitions have to be explained as the product of confusion and thinking someone was saying something they were not.*
Perhaps I can press this worry further with the following cases (for all of which, it is true that the butler is the killer):
Whodunnit? pt. 1:
James and Stephanie are watching a mystery movie at home. In the first half an hour of the film, Stephanie gets sufficient evidence to conclude that the butler was the killer (fill in whatever details you find necessary to get the intuition that she knows). She says to James, 'I know who did it. It was the butler.'
IRI-account predicts: Her ascription was true.
Good so far. I don't know precisely how to quantify stakes, but since they are described as higher or lower, I label the stakes in this part X and describe further stakes as X+ for higher, or X- for lower, and X? for when I am unsure as to how the stakes compare.
Whodunnit? pt. 2:
(Immediately after pt 1)
In response to Stephanie, James says, "You want to bet? A hundred dollars says it wasn't the butler.'
Stakes: X?.
I'm not quite sure what I think happens to the stakes at the mere possibility of a bet.
Whodunnit? pt. 3a:
Stephanie accepts the bet. James thinks to himself, 'It's still very early in the film, she doesn't know who the killer is.'
Stakes: X+. There is now money riding on the bet, and so, provided we are imagining the right sort of case, the IRI account (and the intuitions Stanley uses to motivate his view) would be that James's thought is right, she does not know.
Whodunnit? pt. 3b:
(Instead of pt. 3a) Stephanie declines the bet, because a hundred dollars is a lot to risk over a movie. James says, "See, you don't know. It was just a guess."
Stakes: X The bet has been refused, so the stakes are back to normal. Thus, IRI predicts that, by rejecting the bet, Stephanie maintains her knowledge (or regains it, if the mere offer of a bet was sufficient to raise stakes).
Epilogue to 3a or b: As it is revealed that the butler did it, Stephanie says, "I knew it."
Our intuitions about these cases should diverge for an IRI account, since in (3a) she is evaluating her self in a high stakes scenario, and in (3b) she is evaluating herself in the same stakes as the original scenario. I don't think the cases do diverge though. I think that in either case, her knowledge claim is correct.
If I wanted to make this more directly comparable to the Hannah Bank cases, James would reply with something like, "Movies do sometimes have twist endings." Which might alter my intuitions, but I also think it alters Hannah's evidence base, and thus, might be triggering the wrong sort of intuitions.
Even if people don't share my intuition about the truth of the knowledge claim, there is some data here, namely, that people are often inclined to make such an utterance as a retrospective ascription, so, even if you think its false, some story should be given as to why it is not at all rare in such cases to make the claim.
*Contextualists might fare slightly better, in that they can agree that the utterance of "I knew it" is true in that the utterance in the epilogue context expresses a relation that did obtain throughout the case. However, as I think that independent of this worry, contextualism about "knows" is not very plausible, there are many better worries about contextualism to spend time on.
Thu Mar 9
Lewis Powell
I am going to try and tackle a more central aspect of Clayton's problem with evidentialism this time around. Clayton thinks that we need a way to diagnose what is going wrong when I have an evidentially well founded but false belief.
Consider a perfect evidential reasoner, Smith Jr. He has loads of positive evidence for and no evidence against the belief that Smith Sr. is his biological father. In actuality, Smith Sr. is the identical twin of Smith Jr.'s biological father. No one knows this, not even Smith Sr. who, for whatever reason, believes himself to be the man whose place he took. There is no evidence had by Smith Jr. which could possibly lend credence the belief that Smith Sr. is not his biological father, and ample ample evidence that Smith Sr. is his biological father. However, the fact remains, the belief is false.
Is Smith Jr's false belief justified? I say yes, entirely, Clayton disagrees. Clayton is committed to saying that, in virtue of the belief being false, the belief is not justified. This strikes me as the wrong result, but I don't imagine such a case would be compelling as a counter-example to Clayton who has just such cases in mind.
Clayton can grant me that Smith Jr. formed the evidence appropriate belief. He still wants to say, however, that the belief is not justified. For Clayton, it is justified "only if it has those properties in virtue of which his intention [to show that p] could succeed. His belief is justified only if p."
I have a number of issues with this approach, but I'm going to stick with one for now.
That objection is that Clayton is wedding normative standards for beliefs too closely to what I think is, if a fact at all, a contingent one. That fact is something about the psychology of a person trying to convince another that his belief is justified. There are two issues I have with what Clayton has done here. (a) I don't know that people generally or standardly have the intent that Clayton says they do, and (b) even if they do, it still isn't clear that it should be used to ground normative evaluations in epistemology.
As for (a). Consider an atheist and a devout theist conversing. Both is aware of the other's position, and the theist wants to make sure that the atheist is reasonable in his disbelief. The theist says, "But is your belief that god does not exist justified?"
The atheist, not intending nor attempting to persuade or convince the theist in any way, proceeds to explain why he believes there is no god. His intent is to show the theist that, given his epistemic position, the most reasonable thing stance for him to take is that god does not exist. Even if the atheist is wrong about god, he may be right about his belief being justified.
At the very least, not every instance of endeavoring to justify a belief involves the intent to demonstrate the truth of the belief.
But, the more siginificant point is (b). Imagine a group of people who consider some particular book absolutely infallible. Call it the Big Book o' Truth (BBoT). When the BBoTers want to justify a belief that P, they form only the intent to demonstrate that P is in the BBoT. Clearly, this would not be a solid basis for deriving a theory of epistemic normativity. It might be a good method of determining what the BBoTers take to be the basis for epistemic normativity, but it doesn't seem like whether or not their beliefs are justified actually depends on what is written in the book. Something about the type of intent Clayton discusses should be put forward as having normative weight above and beyond merely being how we intend when we try to justify.
I am going to try and tackle a more central aspect of Clayton's problem with evidentialism this time around. Clayton thinks that we need a way to diagnose what is going wrong when I have an evidentially well founded but false belief.
Consider a perfect evidential reasoner, Smith Jr. He has loads of positive evidence for and no evidence against the belief that Smith Sr. is his biological father. In actuality, Smith Sr. is the identical twin of Smith Jr.'s biological father. No one knows this, not even Smith Sr. who, for whatever reason, believes himself to be the man whose place he took. There is no evidence had by Smith Jr. which could possibly lend credence the belief that Smith Sr. is not his biological father, and ample ample evidence that Smith Sr. is his biological father. However, the fact remains, the belief is false.
Is Smith Jr's false belief justified? I say yes, entirely, Clayton disagrees. Clayton is committed to saying that, in virtue of the belief being false, the belief is not justified. This strikes me as the wrong result, but I don't imagine such a case would be compelling as a counter-example to Clayton who has just such cases in mind.
Clayton can grant me that Smith Jr. formed the evidence appropriate belief. He still wants to say, however, that the belief is not justified. For Clayton, it is justified "only if it has those properties in virtue of which his intention [to show that p] could succeed. His belief is justified only if p."
I have a number of issues with this approach, but I'm going to stick with one for now.
That objection is that Clayton is wedding normative standards for beliefs too closely to what I think is, if a fact at all, a contingent one. That fact is something about the psychology of a person trying to convince another that his belief is justified. There are two issues I have with what Clayton has done here. (a) I don't know that people generally or standardly have the intent that Clayton says they do, and (b) even if they do, it still isn't clear that it should be used to ground normative evaluations in epistemology.
As for (a). Consider an atheist and a devout theist conversing. Both is aware of the other's position, and the theist wants to make sure that the atheist is reasonable in his disbelief. The theist says, "But is your belief that god does not exist justified?"
The atheist, not intending nor attempting to persuade or convince the theist in any way, proceeds to explain why he believes there is no god. His intent is to show the theist that, given his epistemic position, the most reasonable thing stance for him to take is that god does not exist. Even if the atheist is wrong about god, he may be right about his belief being justified.
At the very least, not every instance of endeavoring to justify a belief involves the intent to demonstrate the truth of the belief.
But, the more siginificant point is (b). Imagine a group of people who consider some particular book absolutely infallible. Call it the Big Book o' Truth (BBoT). When the BBoTers want to justify a belief that P, they form only the intent to demonstrate that P is in the BBoT. Clearly, this would not be a solid basis for deriving a theory of epistemic normativity. It might be a good method of determining what the BBoTers take to be the basis for epistemic normativity, but it doesn't seem like whether or not their beliefs are justified actually depends on what is written in the book. Something about the type of intent Clayton discusses should be put forward as having normative weight above and beyond merely being how we intend when we try to justify.
Related Posts (on one page):
- More on evidentialism
- Why I am an evidentialist
Fri Mar 3
Lewis Powell
Clayton posts a paper called "Why I am not an Evidentialist" (presumably a reference to Russell's "Why I am not a Christian").
Clayton's core reason, it seems, is because he links the act of justifying a belief to its being justified in such a way that he says tells against internalism/evidentialism.
I think that (a) Clayton is putting too much force on the process of trying to justify a belief to another as the basis for a belief being justified, and (b) even if we grant that the act of justifying a belief to someone is the basis for justification of the belief, I think evidentialism still comes out ahead.
I'm not going to talk about (a) now, I'd rather focus on (b).
Clayton focuses on justifying beliefs that you still have, while not discussing the justification of beliefs you did have, but have no longer. In short, I think that there is a particular question that is telling about what goes on with epistemic normativity.
That quesiton is "(Well,) what was I supposed to think?"
Imagine a situation in which Smith knows that Jones is very bad at calculus, and overhears Brown offer to sell the answers to an upcoming exam to Jones, but does not hear Jones's response. Smith observes that Jones does not study at all for the exam, and is uncharacteristically unworried about it. After Jones takes the exam, Smith sees Jones take a notecard with distinctive red writing on it out of his sleeve and somwhat sneakily put it in the middle of his Calculus book. Later, Smith sees Jones get the exam back, and notes that Jones got an A. He also sees the notecard sticking out of Jones's book, and it across its top is written "Answers to the calculus exam". Smith comes to believe that Jones cheated on the exam, and his evidence strongly supports it. He confronts Jones about it.
Jones, upset at the accusation, reveals that the card's full text reads, "Answers to the calculus exam will not stump me" over and over again. He had been seeing a hypnotherapist, who had helped relieve him of his normal anxiety about calculus. One of the things he did to relieve it was to write affirmations, which he had done during the last exam.
Smith then says, "Well, what was I supposed to think? You didn't study, you weren't nervous, and somehow you got an A, all after Brown offered to help you cheat."
It seems to me that Smith has just offered a justification for having believed that P, based on his evidence, despite no longer believing P. And this isn't merely a causal account. Smith sees his false view as having been the most reasonable thing to believe at the time, though he revises it in light of the evidence.
If you accept this story as one in which a belief that p was justified despite it being the case that ~p, then, even if the act of justifying a belief to another is related to whether or not that belief is justified, I don't think we have a refutation of evidentialism from it.
As to the title of this post; imagine two scenarios. The real world and a world in which everything is the same as far as my evidence and mental states, but there are also intangible ghosts outside the realm of my sensory evidence. Maybe they're visible under infrared or something, but I don't have any evidence from that band of wavelengths. I can't get behind a theory which says that real-me and ghost-world-me would differ with respect to their justification in believing "there are no ghosts in this room". In part because, I think to myself, "well, let's say I were in ghost-world, would I have any reason to believe differently than I do now?" No, I wouldn't.
I'll wrap this all up with one of my favorite stories about Bertrand Russell, though it may be apocryphal or the quote might be wrong:
Bertrand Russell was once asked what he would say if he found himself standing in front of God. Russell immediately answered that he would assert, "You did not give us enough evidence."
Clayton posts a paper called "Why I am not an Evidentialist" (presumably a reference to Russell's "Why I am not a Christian").
Clayton's core reason, it seems, is because he links the act of justifying a belief to its being justified in such a way that he says tells against internalism/evidentialism.
I think that (a) Clayton is putting too much force on the process of trying to justify a belief to another as the basis for a belief being justified, and (b) even if we grant that the act of justifying a belief to someone is the basis for justification of the belief, I think evidentialism still comes out ahead.
I'm not going to talk about (a) now, I'd rather focus on (b).
Clayton focuses on justifying beliefs that you still have, while not discussing the justification of beliefs you did have, but have no longer. In short, I think that there is a particular question that is telling about what goes on with epistemic normativity.
That quesiton is "(Well,) what was I supposed to think?"
Imagine a situation in which Smith knows that Jones is very bad at calculus, and overhears Brown offer to sell the answers to an upcoming exam to Jones, but does not hear Jones's response. Smith observes that Jones does not study at all for the exam, and is uncharacteristically unworried about it. After Jones takes the exam, Smith sees Jones take a notecard with distinctive red writing on it out of his sleeve and somwhat sneakily put it in the middle of his Calculus book. Later, Smith sees Jones get the exam back, and notes that Jones got an A. He also sees the notecard sticking out of Jones's book, and it across its top is written "Answers to the calculus exam". Smith comes to believe that Jones cheated on the exam, and his evidence strongly supports it. He confronts Jones about it.
Jones, upset at the accusation, reveals that the card's full text reads, "Answers to the calculus exam will not stump me" over and over again. He had been seeing a hypnotherapist, who had helped relieve him of his normal anxiety about calculus. One of the things he did to relieve it was to write affirmations, which he had done during the last exam.
Smith then says, "Well, what was I supposed to think? You didn't study, you weren't nervous, and somehow you got an A, all after Brown offered to help you cheat."
It seems to me that Smith has just offered a justification for having believed that P, based on his evidence, despite no longer believing P. And this isn't merely a causal account. Smith sees his false view as having been the most reasonable thing to believe at the time, though he revises it in light of the evidence.
If you accept this story as one in which a belief that p was justified despite it being the case that ~p, then, even if the act of justifying a belief to another is related to whether or not that belief is justified, I don't think we have a refutation of evidentialism from it.
As to the title of this post; imagine two scenarios. The real world and a world in which everything is the same as far as my evidence and mental states, but there are also intangible ghosts outside the realm of my sensory evidence. Maybe they're visible under infrared or something, but I don't have any evidence from that band of wavelengths. I can't get behind a theory which says that real-me and ghost-world-me would differ with respect to their justification in believing "there are no ghosts in this room". In part because, I think to myself, "well, let's say I were in ghost-world, would I have any reason to believe differently than I do now?" No, I wouldn't.
I'll wrap this all up with one of my favorite stories about Bertrand Russell, though it may be apocryphal or the quote might be wrong:
Bertrand Russell was once asked what he would say if he found himself standing in front of God. Russell immediately answered that he would assert, "You did not give us enough evidence."
Related Posts (on one page):
- More on evidentialism
- Why I am an evidentialist
Tue Feb 7
Lewis Powell
I recently discovered Nick Bostrum's Simulation Argument and accompanying website.
The paper argues that, given certain theories in phil mind, and our knowledge about trends in technological advancement, we should believe one of three things (a) the human species will not last long enough to become 'posthuman', (b) posthuman societies are unlikely to run ancestor simulations, or (c) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation.
It is worth noting that Bostrum does not argue in favor of any particular disjunct, just that we should accept the disjunction as a whole.
Since I read the paper, I've been trying to sort out some of the consequences of (c) for claims about our knowledge and our language. My preliminary thoughts on this are what follow.
I recently discovered Nick Bostrum's Simulation Argument and accompanying website.
The paper argues that, given certain theories in phil mind, and our knowledge about trends in technological advancement, we should believe one of three things (a) the human species will not last long enough to become 'posthuman', (b) posthuman societies are unlikely to run ancestor simulations, or (c) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation.
It is worth noting that Bostrum does not argue in favor of any particular disjunct, just that we should accept the disjunction as a whole.
Since I read the paper, I've been trying to sort out some of the consequences of (c) for claims about our knowledge and our language. My preliminary thoughts on this are what follow.
(show)
Thu Jan 26
Lewis Powell
I've seen, a few places (most recently in this post at Clayton's), the claim that "knowledge doesn't rest on false belief."
I don't know how widespread this is, apart from having seen it more than a couple times in my blog readings, but I wonder if the following case isn't a good challenge to such a principle.
Jones and Smith are thinking about going to see a movie. Jones know that "Underworld: Evolution" opened recently. Smith hates Keira Knightly (despite her excellent performance in "Pirates of the Caribbean"). Jones and Smith both know that Smith hates Knightly, and both of them falsely believe that "Underworld" starts Knightly, rather than its actual star, Kate Beckinsale. On the basis of his belief that Smith does not like Keira Knightly movies, and his belief that "Underworld" is a Keira Knightly movie, Jones comes to believe that Smith will object if he suggests that they go see "Underworld". Which is true.
I'd take Smith to have knowledge in this case, even though it is based directly on a falsehood. Does that seem right?
I've seen, a few places (most recently in this post at Clayton's), the claim that "knowledge doesn't rest on false belief."
I don't know how widespread this is, apart from having seen it more than a couple times in my blog readings, but I wonder if the following case isn't a good challenge to such a principle.
Jones and Smith are thinking about going to see a movie. Jones know that "Underworld: Evolution" opened recently. Smith hates Keira Knightly (despite her excellent performance in "Pirates of the Caribbean"). Jones and Smith both know that Smith hates Knightly, and both of them falsely believe that "Underworld" starts Knightly, rather than its actual star, Kate Beckinsale. On the basis of his belief that Smith does not like Keira Knightly movies, and his belief that "Underworld" is a Keira Knightly movie, Jones comes to believe that Smith will object if he suggests that they go see "Underworld". Which is true.
I'd take Smith to have knowledge in this case, even though it is based directly on a falsehood. Does that seem right?
Wed Jan 18
Lewis Powell
When I was at UR, I took a survey epistemology course from Richard Feldman, and on the last day of class he gave us a humorous and fake take-home final. I've typed up the final, and I got his permission to post the text of it on my website. I thought some other people might get a kick out of it.
Linked from that page is a version of it with links to annotations/explanations of the references. If you notice any errors or omissions or a lack of clarity in the annotations, please let me know. It has been some time since I took the class, and I may be misrememebering or misrepresenting some of the views or cases I discuss.
When I was at UR, I took a survey epistemology course from Richard Feldman, and on the last day of class he gave us a humorous and fake take-home final. I've typed up the final, and I got his permission to post the text of it on my website. I thought some other people might get a kick out of it.
Linked from that page is a version of it with links to annotations/explanations of the references. If you notice any errors or omissions or a lack of clarity in the annotations, please let me know. It has been some time since I took the class, and I may be misrememebering or misrepresenting some of the views or cases I discuss.
Tue Nov 22
Lewis Powell
At the University of Rochester's graduate epistemology conference last year, Timothy Williamson put us all in a Gettier-type situation involving the belief that he had never successfully used powerpoint. We had thought it was true that he hadn't succeeded in using powerpoint because he had tried and there were technical problems, but in fact, he had never tried. So we all justifiably believed that he had never been successful, and it was true, but it seemed as though we did not have knowledge until he revealed that he had actually never tried.
I recently noticed what I take to be another Gettier-style case in real life. This one involves Alexius Meinong.
I believe that Meinong endorsed a wacky ontology.
I believed this primarily from Russell's discussion of Meinong's ontology, and because the view which is named for Meinong is often characterized as having a wacky ontology.
I recently picked up a translation of Meinong's own writings on the subject. Russell's mischaracterization of Meinong's position is fairly drastic, in my opinion. Nonetheless, whatever criteria I was using for wackiness of an ontology before are still met by Meinong's actual ontology. So, I used to have a justified true belief that was not knowledge about Meinong's ontology, and thus, I maintain that I was in a real life Gettier case.
At the University of Rochester's graduate epistemology conference last year, Timothy Williamson put us all in a Gettier-type situation involving the belief that he had never successfully used powerpoint. We had thought it was true that he hadn't succeeded in using powerpoint because he had tried and there were technical problems, but in fact, he had never tried. So we all justifiably believed that he had never been successful, and it was true, but it seemed as though we did not have knowledge until he revealed that he had actually never tried.
I recently noticed what I take to be another Gettier-style case in real life. This one involves Alexius Meinong.
I believe that Meinong endorsed a wacky ontology.
I believed this primarily from Russell's discussion of Meinong's ontology, and because the view which is named for Meinong is often characterized as having a wacky ontology.
I recently picked up a translation of Meinong's own writings on the subject. Russell's mischaracterization of Meinong's position is fairly drastic, in my opinion. Nonetheless, whatever criteria I was using for wackiness of an ontology before are still met by Meinong's actual ontology. So, I used to have a justified true belief that was not knowledge about Meinong's ontology, and thus, I maintain that I was in a real life Gettier case.