Justin Snedegar

Welcome to Megan Henricks, who will start the Ph.D. program at UC Riverside this fall. Post something awesome.

Justin Snedegar

I'm working on a paper idea, and it would be helpful if I knew something about what the going views are on defeating, in the following sense: I may have some evidence that p, but that evidence could be defeated by some (perhaps stronger) evidence that ~p.

I feel like there are probably `internalist' and `externalist' style positions here: on the internalist position, if d defeats evidence e for agent A, then A must know d; on the externalist position, d can defeat e for A even if A does not know d, or something like that. Anyway, any suggestions would be appreciated.

Justin Snedegar

I'll paste the email I sent out here.

Hi everyone,

I've emailed (most of) you before about this group, but things are a bit more worked out now. If you're interested in joining, let me know so you can be involved in deciding where/when to meet.

For those who don't know what it is, contrastivism (in epistemology) is a view, defended mainly by Jonathan Schaffer, which says that knowledge that p is always knowledge that p rather than q, for some 'contrast proposition' q. Thus, the knowledge relation is not binary - Ksp - but ternary - Kspq. Here is Schaffer, from "Contrastive Knowledge":

"Does G.E. Moore know that he has hands? Yes, says the dogmatist: Moore's hands are right before his eyes. No, says the skeptic: for all Moore knows he could be a brain in a vat. Yes and no, says the contrastivist: yes, Moore knows that he has hands rather than stumps; but no, Moore does not know that he has hands rather than vat-images of hands."

So, contrastivism is a cousin both to the relevant alternatives view and to contextualism in epistemology. We'll find out why we should prefer contrastivism to either of those views, I assume.

The first paper we'll read is Schaffer's "Contrastive Knowledge". You can find it on his website, or, more conveniently, I have set up a drop.io site with all of the readings that we'll cover. Here's the link: http://drop.io/usccontrastivism. If, at any point, you need a password (which you shouldn't), it's 'contrastivism'. On that site, you can view the papers, without downloading them, or download them.

I know some of you are not in L.A. If you're interested in joining, we can use the drop.io site to do something online for you.

We'll plan to start the week of June 8. Email me if you're interested.

Justin

Justin Snedegar

Neil Sinhababu, (Singapore National University)

"How Double-Humeans Can Make Room For Error"

Tuesday, May 12, 4 pm, MHP 102

The talk will be about the Humean account of reasons.

Justin Snedegar

Here is a link.

UCLA Logic Center and the Department of Mathematics

The Convergence of Logic, Mathematics and Computer Science

A Public Symposium and Reception

Thursday, April 30, 2009
Kerckhoff Hall, Charles E. Young Grand Salon
2:00pm-7:00pm

Martin Davis, New York University
Michael O. Rabin, Harvard University and Google Research
Moshe Y. Vardi, Rice University

Schedule

2:00-3:00 Moshe Y. Vardi - From Aristotle to the
Pentium

3:00-3:30 Tea break

3:30-4:30 Martin Davis - Hilbert's Tenth Problem

4:30-5:00 Tea break

5:00-6:00 Michael O. Rabin - Novel Concepts of Proof and Their Applications

6:00-7:00 Reception

RSVP to Logicsymp@math.ucla.edu or 310.794.9080

Matt Glass

Sorry this is a bit late, but the annual Reichenbach Lecture will be happening tomorrow (Tuesday, April 14) at UCLA. Here's the information:

The 2009 Reichenbach Lecture

Nancy Cartwright
Professor of Philosophy

London School of Economics and
University of California, San Diego

'Can Queen Physics Rule All the Subjects in Her Dominion?'

Tuesday, April 14, 2009, 3:00 p.m.
Law School, Room 1347

Reception to follow

Should be a good time. I hope the answer to her title question is 'Yes, with an iron fist'.

Justin Snedegar

Joseph Levine and Louise Antony will each give a talk next week at Cal State-LA. Here are the announcements.

California State University, Los Angeles
Department of Philosophy
presents a lecture by

Joseph Levine, U MASS Amherst

“Consciousness and Self-Knowledge: Getting Acquainted With Our Thoughts”

Monday, April 20, 2009

3:15-5:00 PM

King Hall B2006

Reception at 5:00 PM. Engineering & Technology, A-420

and

California State University, Los Angeles
Department of Philosophy
and the Center for the Study of Genders and Sexualities
present the Ann Garry and Sharon Bishop Feminist Endowed Lecture:

Louise Antony, U MASS Amherst

“ What Do We Need to Know about Human Nature?”

Thursday, April 23, 2009

3:15-5:00 PM

University Student Union, Alhambra Room (3rd floor)

Reception at 5:00 PM. Engineering & Technology, A-420

Cal State LA is located at the Eastern Ave. exit of the San Bernardino Freeway (10) a few miles east of downtown LA at the Long Beach Freeway (710). For directions or parking information contact the Philosophy Department at 323-343-4180 or http://www.calstatela.edu/univ/maps/cslamap.htm

Justin Snedegar

I've finally put things together for the contrastivism reading group for the summer. I plan to start early-mid June, and have gathered a bunch of readings.

I've also set up a drop/blog for the group, so it should be easy for people not in L.A. to participate.

Send me an email to let me know if you're interested, and I can send you more information:

jsned12 [at] gmail [dot] com

Justin Snedegar

USC School of Philosophy Colloquium Announcement

Ralph Wedgwood, Oxford University


"A Priori Bootstrapping"

When: Friday, April 3, 4:00-6:00PM
Where: Mudd Hall of Philosophy (MHP) 102
Refreshments will follow after the talk in MHP 113.

Justin Snedegar

I've decided to put together a contrastivism reading group for the summer. I'll start looking for some good stuff to read soon; if anyone has suggestions, let me know. Also, anyone who's interested in participating, let me know.

Justin Snedegar

Maybe it's a little early to be thinking about this, but I want to give people a chance to think about what they may want to read, if they want to do a reading group.

I don't really have any ideas of what to read right now, but I'd be interested in taking part in one or two over the summer. If I think of anything in particular, I'll post it. Everyone should feel free to do the same. (If you live somewhere not in L.A., we can try and do an online reading group.)

UPDATE: Here are some things I would be interested in doing (I'll update the list periodically):

1. Contrastivism (in epistemology, and other fields)
2. Schroeder's Being For
3. Set theory

Justin Snedegar

The conference seemed to be a success. Thanks to the presenters, commentators, chairs, and planners for a great day of philosophy, and to UCLA for hosting.

I assume there will be another conference next year, so if you're at USC or UCLA, be sure to get involved in some respect.

Lewis Powell

I've been reading L. Jonathan Cohen's "An Essay On Belief and Acceptance" in which he argues for the importance of distinguishing belief (understood as a passive state consisting in a certain sort of disposition to feel that something is the case) from acceptance (understood as a voluntary act of policy adoption: the policy of treating something as a premise in reasoning). Cohen thinks this distinction can help untangle a collection of issues in epistemology and action theory (specifically purposive explanations).

Does anyone know of other good books or articles to read addressing this purported contrast between belief and acceptance? I'd be interested both in writings that defend the contrast as well as those arguing that it is specious or unimportant.

Justin Snedegar

USC School of Philosophy Colloquium Announcement

James Joyce, University of Michigan, "The Probative Value of Old Evidence"

When: Friday, February 20, 4:00-6:00PM
Where: Mudd Hall of Philosophy (MHP) 102
Refreshments will follow after the talk in MHP 113.

Justin Snedegar

Joseph Raz will be visiting USC between March 23 and April 9. He will give a talk on March 27 at 3pm at the USC Law School. More details should follow, but if they don't, and you want more details, let me know.

Justin Snedegar

The USC/UCLA Grad Conference is coming up next weekend. Here's an announcement from the conference organizer:

The 4th USC/UCLA Graduate Conference in Philosophy will take place on Saturday, February 21, 2009. This year is UCLA's turn to host the conference, and host it they will in Dodd Hall, room 121, beginning with 10:00 in the morning. We haven't finalized the details of the program yet, but I can tell you that there will be a breakfast at 9:30 and presentations will probably end at around 6:30 in the evening. The conference will be followed by a Reception. Breakfast, Lunch and Reception will be offered by UCLA in Dodd Hall, room 399 (their graduate lounge).

Everyone is invited to attend. Our keynote address will be given this year by Prof. Stephen Yablo, from MIT (we don't know the title of the paper yet.) This year looks very promising in terms of the quality of the papers, as well as the diversity of the philosophical areas covered by the papers.

For updates on the program and for directions to UCLA's Department of Philosophy as well as for info on parking, please visit the conference website: http://uscucla.conference.googlepages.com/home.

Justin Snedegar

I'm taking a Probability and Epistemology class with Kenny Easwaran and Jim Van Cleve this semester. We've been looking at various representation theorems, and examining the axioms. One seemingly plausible axiom is from (Joyce's presentation of) Savage's theory, called "Independence". Joyce (from Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, pp. 85-85) tells us that this axiom tells us that "a rational agent's preference between [actions] A and A* should not depend on what happens in circumstances where the two yield identical outcomes." Joyce gives brief intuitive motivation for this axiom: "Given that A and A* produce equally good results when E is false it is plausible to think that any reason for preferring one to the other would have to be based on an assessment of their relative merits when E is true."

The idea is that any rational agent's preferences will satisfy the axioms. So, a counterexample to an axiom would be an agent who is rational, but whose preferences do not satisfy the axiom. As a possible counterexample to Independence, Kenny presented the Allais Paradox. It goes like this:
Imagine you have a (well-shuffled) deck of 100 cards, numbered 1-100. In the first scenario, you choose between A1 and B1:

A1:
If card number 1 is drawn, you win $0 (1% chance)
If any of cards 2-10 are drawn, you win $5 million (9% chance)
If any of cards 11-100 are drawn, you win $0 (90% chance)

B1:
If card 1 is drawn, you win $1 million
If any of cards 2-10 are drawn, you win $1 million
If any of cards 11-100 are drawn, you win $0

Next, you are asked to choose between A2 and B2:

A2:
If 1 is drawn, you win $0
If 2-10 are drawn, you win $5 million
If 11-100 are drawn, you win $1 million

B2:
If 1 is drawn, you win $1 million
If 2-10 are drawn, you win $1 million
If 11-100 are drawn, you win $1 million

Apparently, most people will choose A1 in the first game, and B2 in the second. This isn't supposed to seem irrational. But, since each of the pairs A1 & B1, and A2 & B2, are identical with respect to what happens when cards 11-100 are drawn, all that should matter, according to Independence, when it comes time to choose is what happens when 1-10 are drawn. But, in the first game, people want to pick the first option, while in the second game, people want to pick the second option, even though, once cards 11-100 are taken out of consideration, the pairs become identical. Satisfying Independence would require choosing either both A's or both B's. So, if Independence is a good axiom, rationality should require the same. But, it doesn't seem to. So, we have a counterexample to Independence.

I'm not sure what to think about this. There are reasons to think that the choice of first A1, and then B2, may be irrational, or at least motivated by non-rational motives. One of these may be risk-aversion. In the second game, choosing B2 guarantees you $1 million, while choosing A2 gives you a (small) chance of walking away with nothing. In the first game, you have a good chance of walking away with nothing with either option. So, if card 1 gets drawn and you chose A1, you may not feel so bad. But, if you could have had a guaranteed million dollars in the second game, and end up with nothing, you may feel worse. Also, I bet that the results would differ if we were dealing with smaller amounts of money, say $0, $1, and $5, or even $0, $100, $500. Is this irrational? I don't know, but it may cast a little doubt on the Paradox's status as a true counterexample.

Justin Snedegar

There will be a talk at USC, Mudd Hall of Philosophy, Room 102, on Friday at 4pm:

Shamik Dasgupta, NYU, "Symmetry and the Undetectable"



Also, what are people working on this semester?
I've been working mostly on Davidson's last book, Truth and Predication, some stuff on deontic logic, and a bit of formal epistemology.

Justin Snedegar

First, there will be a talk this Friday, January 16th, at USC, at 4pm in Mudd Hall of Philosophy, Room 102.

Geoffrey Lee, NYU - "Snapshots, Inner Theaters, and the Specious Present"

Second, the papers have been selected for the UCLA/USC Grad Conference this February:

* Tim Button, Cambridge and Harvard University - "What is an Indefinite Totality?"

* Joe Hedger, Arizona State University - "New York is just New York"

* Bradley Rettler, University of Notre Dame - "Simple Persistence"

* Brandon Warmke, Florida State University - "In Defense of Invariantism About Moral Responsibility"

* Briggs Wright, University of Texas at Austin - "Many, But Almost Holmes?"

More information about the conference here.

Lewis Powell

I haven't read the book "Anathem" by Neal Stephenson yet (I just bought it today), but I bought because a friend recommended it to me, and it has been a while since I read any fiction.

The reason I am posting about my fiction reading here is due to the way my friend sold me on it. He told me about this description of the book (which was given while the book was being written):

"[Stephenson]'s writing a science fiction novel unrelated to Cryptonomicon and the Baroque Cycle. It's set on another planet and has aliens and so on. It's really about Platonic mathematics, but he needed the aliens and space opera-ish elements to spice it up a little bit, just like the pirates kept people engaged in the Baroque books" (source).

So, maybe its cheating to count it as fiction, since I decided to get it based on the promise of philosophy, but I think I'm okay with that.